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OBSTACLES STANDING IN THE WAY
OF STANDING UNDER § 1981
AND TITLE VII
"The standing of the testers is, as an original matter, dubious...
they suffer no harm other than that which they invite in order to
make a case against the persons investigated."1
INTRODUCTION
Two people apply for the same position at the same company.
One of the applicants is a qualified white male and the other is a black
male who happens to have similar or even comparatively superior
credentials. After interviewing the applicants, the company offers the
position to the white applicant, but not to the black applicant. Two
federal statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 19812 and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,3 enable the black applicant to seek redress for any inju-
ries resulting from the company's alleged hiring discrimination. Un-
1 Village ofBeliwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994), which provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is en-
joyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994), which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any in-
dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ....
Title VII also specifically extends this prohibition of private discrimination to employ-
ment agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1994) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin...."
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der either statute, the black applicant has standing to bring suit against
the company.
4
But what if the black applicant in the scenario above has no in-
terest in the position but applies solely to uncover potential discrimi-
natory hiring practices? 5 Should this person be able to sue the com-
pany, under § 1981 and Title VII, for its alleged hiring discrimina-
tion? This Note addresses the numerous obstacles such applicants,
known as "testers," 6 must overcome in order to have standing under §
1981 and Title VII, statutes which both fail to explicitly mention test-
ers. As the following analysis demonstrates, testers cannot overcome
these obstacles with respect to § 1981 and will have extreme diffi-
culty overcoming them with respect to Title VII.
First, I will examine the purpose and use of testers, especially in
connection with Title VII. Second, I will review the criteria that must
be met before any plaintiff, including testers, can even bring a cause
of action. These criteria, comprising the standing doctrine, include
constitutional requirements as well as court-imposed prudential barri-
ers to standing. Third, I will examine tester claims to standing under
§ 1981. A review of the pertinent case law indicates that testers lack
standing under this section since their alleged injuries do not fall
within the statute's "zone of interests." Fourth, I will examine tester
claims to standing under Title VII. This analysis proves far more
complex than the analysis for tester standing under § 1981. Courts
have differed as to whether employment testers have standing under
Title VII. Furthermore, a tangled web of Supreme Court decisions
and a questionable analogy to the Fair Housing Act demonstrates that
testers, at the very least, will have difficulty satisfying the standing
criteria. Finally, I will explain that even if testers overcome these
obstacles, granting them standing not only fails to advance the broad
aims of Title VII, but also may prove disadvantageous to testers and
bona fide job applicants alike.
4 A grant of standing does not mean that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits. They
are separate inquiries. See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
151-52 (1970) (explaining that "'the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute
sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of judicial resolution"') (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968)).
5 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently faced this question and concluded that
the applicant has standing under Title VII, but not under § 1981. See Kyles v. J.K. Guardian
Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2000).
6 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has defined "testers" as
"individuals who apply for employment which they do not intend to accept, for the sole purpose
of uncovering unlawful discriminatory hiring practices." EEOC, Policy Guidance No. 915.062,
in EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL VOL. 1, at 1 (Nov. 20, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 Policy Guid-
ance]. See also Kyles, 222 F.3d at 291 n.1.
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It is imperative to realize that the motives of the employment
tester and of a bona fide applicant are different-the applicant wants a
job while the tester wants to uncover evidence of discrimination.
Therefore, the following review of whether the tester has standing
will revolve around whether this distinction matters or whether it is
merely a distinction without a difference that should not preclude a
tester from having standing under § 1981 and Title VII.
I. THE PURPOSE AND USE OF TESTERS
Suits brought by bona fide job applicants shortly after the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the statute encompassing Title VII,
7
went a long way toward removing the more egregious forms of hiring
discrimination. 8 From an institutional standpoint, "testers" were not
needed at this time to uncover discrimination in hiring practices since
no clear enforcement void existed.
9
At some point in time, probably beginning in the 1970s, the filing
of suits challenging hiring decisions began to decrease dramatically
relative to those suits filed to challenge company decisions discharg-
ing employees.' 0 Although suits initially challenging hiring decisions
under Title VII outnumbered suits to contest discharges, 11 a trend in
the opposite direction soon emerged. By 1985, suits challenging dis-
charge greatly outnumbered suits challenging hiring decisions. 12
These figures suggest that suits brought by bona fide applicants
under Title VII are far fewer than the actual incidents of hiring dis-
7 Although case law does not indicate a separate history of utilizing testers to enforce §
1981, many testers that bring actions under Title VII also bring separate actions under § 1981.
See Kyles, 222 F.3d at 292 (suing under both Title VII and § 1981); Fair Employment Council
of Greater vash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same).
8 See Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and
Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM 403, 411 (1993) (pointing out that "[il]itigation in the sixties and seventies removed many
of the most formidable and blatant employment practices barring the entry of minorities and
women into the workforce").
9 See id. at 410 (concluding that when private actions "result in an optimum level of
enforcement, then there are few if any benefits to using testers to enforce Title vIr').
10 See John J. Donohue ImI & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983,984 (1991).
1 See id. at 1015 ("Hiring charges outnumbered termination charges by 50 percent in
1966 .... ).
12 See id (explaining that "by 1985, the ratio had reversed by more than 6 to 1"). See also
Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII Back Pay Rem-
edy, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 1301, 1346-47 (1990) (finding that between 1974 and 1985, charges filed
with the EEOC alleging failure to hire on the basis of race decreased as a percentage of total
charges from twelve percent to six percent and charges alleging race discrimination in employ-
ment discharge during the same time rose from twenty-three percent to thirty-seven percent).
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crimination. 13  Consequently, suits brought under Title VII have not
resulted in "an optimal level of enforcement."' 14  The resultant en-
forcement void demonstrates that Title VII is not meeting one of the
goals for which it was created, namely, to put an end to discrimina-
tory hiring practices.
In response, organizations charged with combating discrimination
in the workplace have looked for other ways to supplement bona fide
applicant suits to step up enforcement of Title VII. In 1990, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") made a step in this
direction by officially supporting the use of testers to increase the
level of enforcement of Title VII.15 During the summer of that same
year, the Urban Institute 16 conducted the first pilot study utilizing
testers to "fill the gap in empirical evidence concerning the extent and
character of hiring discrimination in the United States."
' 17
The Urban Institute's study deployed ten groups of two men each
into the labor markets of Washington, D.C. and Chicago, Illinois. 1I A
black and a white man comprised each of these two-man groups.
19
Altogether, the groups conducted 476 "hiring audits," 20 which re-
vealed "that unequal treatment of black job seekers is entrenched and
widespread. ' 21  Specifically, the study revealed that "in one out of
five audits, the white applicant was able to advance further through
13 See Yelnosky, supra note 8, at 409 (concluding that "the current enforcement scheme
under Title VII has resulted in underenforcement of the Act in the context of hiring for lower-
skilled, entry-level jobs").
14 Id. See also Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 10, at 1023.
15 See 1990 Policy Guidance, supra note 6, at 31-38 (endorsing the use of testers to un-
cover discriminatory hiring practices and encouraging civil rights groups to utilize testers to this
end).
n 16 For a description of the Urban Institute, see MARJERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL, URBAN
INSTITUTE REPORT 91-9, OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DIS-
CRIMINATION IN HIRING iii (1991).
17 Id. at xi.
18 Id. at 1 ("They applied for entry-level jobs advertised in the newspaper, and each appli-
cant reported his treatment at every stage of the hiring process."). Washington, D.C. and Chi-
cago were chosen for the study because they were both "major conurbations," were both "in-
cluded in the 1989 national Housing Discrimination Study," and because both "differ[ed] in
terms of industrial structure, labor market tightness, demographic composition, and other fac-
tors." Id. at 16.
19 Id. at 1 (explaining that "[tien pairs of young men--each pair consisting of a black and
white-were carefully matched on all characteristics").
20 Id. at I 1 ("In a hiring audit, a minority group tester and majority group tester are care-
fully matched on all attributes that could affect the hiring decision. Specifically, they are paired
in terms of age, physical size, education, experience, and other 'human capital' characteristics,
as well as such intangibles as openness, apparent energy level, and articulateness .... Once
auditors have been matched, an opening for an entry-level job is identified in the local newspa-
per and each auditor separately attempts to inquire about the position, complete an application,
obtain an interview, and be offered the job. The incidence of differential treatment is deter-
mined by comparing the experiences and outcomes of the two auditors.").
21 Id. at 61.
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the hiring process than his equally qualified black counterpart. ' 22
Furthermore, "in one out of eight--or 15 percent--of the audits, the
white was offered a job although his equally qualified black partner
was not."23 The study concluded by recommending the development
and implementation of an extensive testing program to determine the
level of hiring discrimination throughout the U.S. 24
Perhaps inspired by the Urban Institute's study, other groups
charged with ferreting out hiring discrimination soon developed and
implemented similar testing programs. Although many of these pro-
grams have focused on uncovering racial discrimination in hiring,
25
other studies have focused on sex discrimination in the hiring proc-
ess.2 6  Nevertheless, an extensive, nationwide testing program envi-
sioned by the Urban Institute has never materialized. 27  Similarly,
EEOC efforts to develop and implement comprehensive pilot pro-
22 Id. at 2.
23 id.
24 Id. at 3 ("The authors conclude that the next logical step is to design and implement a
nationwide employment audit for both blacks and Hispanics .... [A] full-scale hiring audit
would provide statistically reliable estimates of the incidence of discrimination in hiring for the
nation as a whole.").
2 See Massachusetts Agency Settles Job Tester Cases, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 77, at
D-21 (Apr. 23, 1993) (describing a Massachusetts pilot program sponsored by the Massachu-
setts Commission Against Discrimination that "used employment testers in 60 to 70 different
stores in the state"); NAACP Uses Testers as Basis of Bias Complaint Against Miami Store,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 247, at A-5 (Dec. 24, 1990) (describing a Miami-based program
sponsored by the NAACP where "NAACP testers visited eight [department] stores and were
discriminated against at three"); OFCCP: Philadelphia Region Sending "Testers" Into Compa-
nies to Detect Discrimination, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at D-8 (Jan. 29, 1996) (referring
to the launch of a Philadelphia pilot program sponsored by the Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance Programs, "the first time a federal agency has used testers to identify significant prob-
lems of discrimination in employment"); OFCCP: "Tester" Programs Get Under Way in Chi-
cago, San Francisco, OFCCP Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 89, at AA-2 (May 8, 1997)
(describing a Chicago pilot program sponsored by the Labor Department's Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs which involved "sending a Hispanic and a white job applicant
into the workplaces of federal contractors").
2 See OFCCP: "Tester" Programs Get Under Way in Chicago, San Francisco, OFCCP
Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 89, at AA-2 (May 8, 1997) (describing a San Francisco pilot
program sponsored by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs involving "testers
of white men and women who apply for jobs at federal contractors"); Sex Discrimination: Em-
ployment Testing Project Shows Bias Against Female Mechanics in San Francisco, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 119, at A-5 (June 20, 2000) (describing an Impact Fund study where forty
matched pairs of testers, consisting of one male and one female, sought immediate openings in
San Francisco auto service shops and reporting that "in 60 percent of the tests, or 12 out of 20,
the male applicant was preferred, while in 15 percent, or three of 20, the female was preferred").
27 Although it has conducted many pilot studies since 1991, the Urban Institute has yet to
conduct a nationwide study. See Discrimination: Urban Institute Researchers Urge Expansion
of Testing to Unearth Bias, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at A-9 (Mar. 3, 1999) (announcing
that '[a]fter a decade of experience and 10 local pilot studies, we're ready to do paired testing
of employment discrimination on a national level' (quoting Michael Fix, coeditor of a report of
a 1998 Department of Housing and Urban Development conference on the subject)) (emphasis
added).
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grams utilizing testers have been met with opposition and have failed
to bear fruit.
28
Although the EEOC has not sponsored such programs monetarily,
it has continued to endorse programs utilizing testers. Throughout the
past decade, groups sponsoring these studies have sued employers
and employment agencies that have allegedly discriminated against
its testers. In addition, the testers themselves have brought claims
against these employers and employment agencies under § 1981 and
Title VII. Of particular significance to the various issues this Note
addresses, the EEOC has declared29 and reaffirmed that employ-
ment testers and organizations utilizing employment testers have
standing to bring suit under Title VII. Before endorsing or criticizing
the EEOC's view of tester standing, one must examine the formal
barriers a plaintiff must surmount to satisfy a grant of standing.
I. THE STANDING DOCTRINE
A. Constitutional Standing
Before a federal court analyzes the merits of any lawsuit, the
party initiating the suit must have standing.31 This standing require-
ment has its roots in Article III of the Constitution,32 which expressly
limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to a resolution of "cases
and controversies." 33  The Supreme Court has held that implicit in
28 See id. ("The [EEOC] has a long-standing policy of supporting the use of testers, but
the agency has not been involved in the effort on a more formal basis. And last year, Republi-
can legislators tied a commission budget increase to the agency's agreement to stop financially
supporting a pilot program in the form of contracts to two private civil rights organizations to
further explore the concept.").
29 See 1990 Policy Guidance, supra note 6, at 31-38.
30 See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Using Testers to File Charges and Litigate Em-
ployment Discrimination Claims, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 102, at D-32 (May 28, 1996).
31 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) ("In essence the question of standing is
whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular
issues.").
32 See U.S. CONST. art. II1, § 2, cl. 1:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, aris-
ing under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases af-
fecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citi-
zens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
33 See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (explaining that "whether the plaintiff has made out a 'case




this constitutional limitation is the requirement that a party invoking a
court's jurisdiction have standing.34  In addition, the Court has held
that standing turns on one's personal stake in the dispute.35  Conse-
quently, determining a party's stake in a dispute will ultimately re-
solve whether that party has satisfied the constitutional standing re-
quirement.
A personal stake sufficient to confer standing exists only if the
following requirements are satisfied: (1) the plaintiff must suffer an
"injury in fact, i.e., a concrete and particularized, actual or imminent
invasion of a legally protected interest";36 (2) "there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of"; 37 and
(3) "it is 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury
will be 'redressed by a favorable decision."' 38  Employment testers,
therefore, must meet these three criteria in order to satisfy the Article
III requirements for standing.
B. Prudential Limitations and Statutory Standing
Satisfying the constitutional standing requirements, although
necessary to confer standing on a party, may not always be sufficient.
The Supreme Court has imposed its own prudential barriers to stand-
ing in addition to those limits specifically imposed by the Constitu-
tion.39  These judicially imposed barriers to standing additionally
require that a plaintiff's injury must be distinct from the effects felt by
other citizens and that a plaintiff "must assert his own legal rights
34 N.E. Fla. Ch. of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508
U.S. 656, 663 (1993) ("The doctrine of standing is 'an essential and unchanging part of the case-
or-controversy requirement of Article Il."') (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555,560 (1992)).
35 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,72 (1978) (explain-
ing that "[t]he essence of the standing inquiry is whether the parties seeking to invoke the
court's jurisdiction have 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of the issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions') (quoting Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962)).
36 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). See also Whitmore v. Ar-
kansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (stating that the injury must be "actual or imminent, not 'con-
jectural' or 'hypothetical') (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02
(1983)); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (finding that a plaintiff must demonstrate "'some actual or threatened
injury'") (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
a Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
38 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38,43 (1976)).
39 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (explaining that the standing "inquiry
involves both constitutional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations
on its exercise") (emphasis added).
40 See iii at 499 (explaining that "when the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance'
shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally
does not warrant exercise ofjurisdiction").
2002]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties. ',4 1 In addition, a plaintiffs complaint must
"fall within 'the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question.' 42 Therefore, a plain-
tiff has standing only after both meeting the Article III requirements
and satisfying these judicially imposed prudential limitations. 43
These prudential barriers to standing, however, do not apply to
all claims brought by plaintiffs. The Supreme Court has recognized
that "Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who
otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. ' 4 Although
an express grant by Congress may eliminate any prudential barriers to
standing, Congress cannot eliminate the Article I constitutional re-
quirements for standing.45 In other words, even when Congress has
passed a statute that grants an express right of action, the Article HI
constitutional requirements for standing still must be satisfied.
Although statutorily created rights may not reduce the threshold
for standing below Article HI requirements, such rights may influence
the Article III standing analysis. For example, the Supreme Court has
held that the "injury in fact" requirement of Article 1146 "may exist
solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing."' '47 This language gives rise to the inference
that the "injury in fact" requirement is satisfied automatically when a
plaintiff invokes a federal statute. Whether this is true or not will
greatly affect the standing analysis for employment testers. Signifi-
cantly, if the "injury in fact" requirement is satisfied when any plain-
tiff brings actions under § 1981 or Title VII, then employment testers
need not make a separate proof that they have been injured. 48
The following analysis of employment tester standing under
§ 1981 and Title VII will examine the Article IR requirements and
41 Id.
42 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464,475 (1982) (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970)).
43 See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 471 ("The term 'standing' subsumes a
blend of constitutional requirements and prudential considerations."). See also Warth, 422 U.S.
at 498.
44 Warth, 422 U.S. at 501.
45 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997).
46 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
4' Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973)).
Linda R.S., in dicta, also stated that the requirement of an actual, de facto injury was needed "at
least in the absence of a statute expressly conferring standing." Id. at 617.
48 Of course, such plaintiffs must still satisfy the other requirements of Article III stand-
ing: that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and that it is




any prudential barriers to standing. The statutes themselves also will
be examined since prudential barriers may be eliminated and the "in-
jury in fact" requirement may be satisfied by the creation of statutory
rights. Essentially, the inquiry will attempt to answer two central
questions: (1) Does the statute invoked by the testers create legal
rights which eliminate prudential barriers; and (2) has the tester plain-
tiff suffered the "injury in fact" required by Article I of the Consti-
tution?
III. EMPLOYMENT TESTER STANDING UNDER § 1981
Employment testers do not have standing under § 1981. This
statute does not create substantive rights that eliminate prudential bar-
riers to standing. Rather, any plaintiff bringing an action under
§ 1981, including testers, must demonstrate that prudential barriers do
not preclude standing before even addressing the Article In standing
requirements. One of the prudential barriers to standing provides that
the injury alleged must be within the "zone of interests" protected by
a statute.49 Since injuries allegedly suffered by tester plaintiffs do not
fall within the "zone of interests" grotected by § 1981, testers cannot
overcome this prudential barrier. As a result, testers do not have
standing under § 1981. This Note now examines the judicial ration-
ales for this lack of standing.
A. The First Test: Employment Tester Standing in Fair Employment
Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp.
Employment tester standing was first addressed in 1993. In Fair
Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing
Corp.,5 1 an equal employment organization sent two black testers to
an employment agency in search of job referrals. 52 The organization
also sent two white testers with similar qualifications to the same
agency. The white testers both received referrals while the black test-
ers did not.53 The black testers brought suit, alleging violations of §
49 See supra text accompanying note 42.
" Section 1981 does not demonstrate Congress' intent to remove prudential barriers to
standing. Since failing to overcome court-imposed prudential barriers precludes standing, an
Article III analysis is rendered meaningless and unnecessary for testers under § 1981. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text. Therefore, the standing analysis for testers under § 1981 ends
once it is demonstrated that testers cannot overcome the prudential barriers under that statute.
s1 829 F. Supp. 402 (D.D.C. 1993).
52 Id. at 403.
53 id.
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1981 and Title VII. 54  The district court denied the agency's motion
for summary judgment on both claims.55
This decision was partially reversed on appeal.56 The D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals first addressed the plaintiffs' claims under
§ 1981. These claims alleged violations of § 1981 on two fronts.
First, the testers argued that the agency's failure to hire them pre-
vented them from contracting with it for job referrals. 57 Even assum-
ing that BMC enters into contracts with testers posing as job seekers,
the court recognized that such contracts are voidable. 58  The court
determined that "the loss of the opportunity to enter into a void con-
tract... is not an injury cognizable under § 1981, for a void contract
is a legal nullity.' 59 The contract that resulted between the plaintiffs
and BMC, however, was not a void contract, but one voidable at
BMC's option. Nevertheless, the court was able to reconcile this dis-60 ,
tinction and concluded that "the loss of the opportunity to enter into
a contract voidable at the other party's will is not cognizable under §
1981."61
The plaintiffs also claimed that BMC's refusal to hire the tester
plaintiffs prevented them from contracting with potential employ-
ers.6 2  Once again, the court found no merit to this claim, relying on
the fact that the "testers concededly had no interest in securing a job
54 id.
55 Id. at 408. Although the motion was denied with respect to § 1981 and Title VII, the
district court granted the defendant's motion as it pertained to § 1981a(a)(1). This section codi-
fies the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII by enabling plaintiffs to recover
compensatory and punitive damages. Prior to the amendments, plaintiffs could only seek in-
junctive relief. See infra text accompanying notes 104-09.
56 Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
57 Id. at 1270 (arguing that the defendant's refusal to hire the testers "deprived them of the
opportunity to enter into contracts with BMC for employment referrals").
58 Id. at 1271 ("Any resulting contracts between the tester plaintiffs and BMC would have
been voidable at BMC's option ... "). The court supported this conclusion by explaining that
"even if BMC sometimes does enter into contracts with job-seekers, the testers here made con-
scious and material misrepresentations of fact by deceiving BMC about their intentions and by
presenting BMC with fictitious credentials." Id. at 1270-71. These misrepresentations make
the contract voidable at the option of the nonmisrepresenting party. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(l) (1981) ("If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by either
a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justi-
fied in relying, the contract is voidable by the recipient.").
59 Fair Employment Council, 28 F.3d at 1271.
60 The court needed to minimize the distinction between a void contract and one voidable
by BMC to conclude that the testers suffered no cognizable injury. The court accomplished this
by focusing on the misrepresentations the testers made to the defendant by supplying false in-
formation on their job referral applications. The court determined these misrepresentations
should protect BMC since "it is generally worse for the contract to be voidable than for it to be





through BMC.' 63 Specifically, the court noted that being deprived of
"the opportunity to refuse to enter into an employment contract"
64
with an employment agency's clients is not an injury cognizable un-
der § 1981.
B. Section 1981 and the Prudential Barriers to Standing
Although the D.C. Circuit's decision in Fair Employment Council
may have held correctly that testers did not receive injuries "cogniza-
ble under § 1981," the court reached this resolution absent a thorough
analysis of standing doctrine. Since the court's decision only ad-
dressed whether the injury was within the "zone of interests" of the
statute,65 a prudential consideration, 66 the court should have made an
additional inquiry. Specifically, the court needed to determine
whether § 1981 removed prudential barriers to standing.
Unless the statute eliminates these prudential barriers, then the
testers would not have standing since they could not surmount the
"zone of interest" barrier. On the other hand, if § 1981 eliminates
prudential barriers, then the plaintiffs need not show that the injuries
they received are within the "zone of interests" protected by the stat-
ute.6 7 Rather, all the plaintiffs would have to do is to satisfy the Arti-
cle III requirements to gain standing.68 Consequently, the D.C. Cir-
cuit cut the analysis short, possibly assuming rather than expressly
enunciating that § 1981 does not eliminate prudential barriers to
standing.
Federal courts recently addressing whether employment testers
have standing under § 1981 also have concluded that they do not. In
Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Security Services, Inc.,6 9 the district court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that both
"Title VII and Section 1981 impose the standing requirement of bona
fide applicant for employment." 70  The court based its conclusion
63 Id. The court noted that the plaintiffs actually promised the Fair Employment Council
that they would not accept any job offers obtained "in conjunction with their testing activities."
Id.
64id.
6 Id. The court could have concluded that the alleged harm to the plaintiffs was not an
injury cognizable under Article III of the Constitution. Instead, the court's continual reference
to "injury cognizable under § 1981" demonstrates that the court was focusing on whether the
statute actually protected the alleged injury. As a result, the court was implicating the "zone of
interests" prudential limitation to standing rather than the Article III requirements for standing.
See sura text accompanying note 42.
See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
67 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
68 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
69 No. 97-C-8311, 1998 WL 677165, at *1 (N.D. 1. Sept. 22, 1998).
70 Id. at *3.
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primarily on case law holding that applicants must intend to accept a
job in order to prove a prima facie case of discrimination under either
statute.71  Nevertheless, the court specifically addressed Article I,
claiming that "[b]ecause they allege no concrete and personal injury,
plaintiffs have no stake in the outcome of the lawsuit."
72
Although the grant of summary judgment with respect to § 1981
was affirmed on appeal, 73 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
jected the district court's rationale. The court instead relied on the
rationale from Fair Employment Council. For example, the Seventh
Circuit drew comparisons between the testers in Fair Employment
Council and the testers in the case before it.7 4  Consequently, the
court concluded that "in terms of the essential right that section 1981
protects... [the plaintiffs] suffered no injury."75
Similar to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Fair Employment Coun-
cil, the Seventh Circuit decision in Kyles also found that testers do not
suffer injuries cognizable under § 1981. 7 6  Nevertheless, there is an
important distinction between the two cases. Kyles went one step fur-
ther than Fair Employment Council by addressing whether § 1981 is
one of those statutes that removes prudential barriers to standing. The
court determined that § 1981 is not one of these statutes.77
In making this determination, the Seventh Circuit contrasted
§ 1981 with a statute that does remove prudential barriers, the Fair
Housing Act.78  The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress
intended the Fair Housing Act to removerudential barriers by ex-
tending standing to the limits of Article HI.79 As a result, courts "lack
71 See id. ("In order to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under
either Title VII or § 1981, a plaintiff must show a genuine intention to accept the employment if
offered.") (citing Allen v. Prince George's County, 538 F. Supp. 833 (D. Md. 1982)). For a
further discussion on proving the prima facie case under Title VII and its significance for the
Title VII standing analysis, see infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
72 Kyles, 1998 WL 677165 at *2.
73 Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2000).
74 Id. at 302 ("[The testers] had no genuine interest in employment with [the defendant],
and neither would have accepted an offer of employment had one been extended. Indeed, both
had signed agreements ... promising not to accept employment with any of the firms whose
employment practices they were directed to test.").
75 Id.
76 Id. at 304 ("The discrimination may be altogether real, and the tester may have suffered
an identifiable injury; but the employer has not deprived the tester of her right to make or en-
force contracts. The tester's injury, if any, is one that lies outside the zone of interests that
section 1981 protects.").
77 See id. at 303-04.
7' 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000). The Fair Housing Act is also known as Title VIII.
79 See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979) (stating
that "Congress intended standing under [the Fair Housing Act] to extend to the full limits of Art.
I11"); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (finding that words
used in the Fair Housing Act "showed 'a congressional intention to define standing as broadly
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authority to create prudential barriers to standing in suits brought un-
der that [Act]." 80 Consequently, a plaintiff's alleged injury need not
be within the specific "zone of interests" protected by the Fair Hous-
ing Act since the statute automatically eliminates this prudential bar-
rier from the standing analysis. Instead, a plaintiff bringing an action
under the Fair Housing Act only needs to satisfy the Article Ill injury
requirement.
8 1
Kyles, however, distinguished § 1981 from the Fair Housing Act
and other statutes that eliminate prudential barriers to standing. In so
doing, the court contrasted the broad rights guaranteed by the Fair
Housing Act with the more specific right guaranteed by § 1981. Spe-
cifically, the court determined that, unlike the broad reach of the Fair
Housing Act, § 1981 is narrowly tailored to protect "the right to enter
into and preserve a contractual relationship, period." 82 Having recog-
nized the specific right protected by § 1981, the court concluded that
"[t]he class of persons who may bring suit is therefore limited to per-
sons who actually wish to enter into (or remain in) that relation-
ship."83 Consequently, § 1981 protects only those plaintiffs within its
"zone of interests," i.e., those persons that intend to enter into con-
tracts or remain in a contractual relationship.
84
C. Tester Motive and the "Zone of Interests" Protected by § 1981
Since § 1981 does not eliminate prudential barriers to standing,
employment testers must demonstrate that they satisfy court-imposed
prudential considerations as well as the Article III standing require-
ments before the merits of their cases are addressed. One of these
prudential considerations involves whether the injuries alleged by
employment testers are within the "zone of interests" protected by
§ 1981. Since § 1981 protects only parties who contract or intend to
remain in a contractual relationship, a party must contract or intend to
as is permitted by Article In of the Constitution') (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc. 445
F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971)).
so Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,372 (1982).
81 Kyles, 222 F.3d at 296 ("Thus the sole requirement for standing to sue under [the Fair
Housing Act] is the Art. I minima of injury in fact: that the plaintiff allege that as a result of
the defendant's actions he has suffered 'a distinct and palpable injury."') (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)).
s2 Id at 303. See also Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding that sections 1981 and 1982 "have a limited province and do not qualify as all-purpose
antidiscrimination or comprehensive open housing laws"); Grant v. Smith, 574 F.2d 252, 255
(5th Cir. 1978) (noting that good faith in contracting is necessary under sections 1981 and 1982,
but is not pertinent to the broad standing allowed by the Fair Housing Act).
s Kyles, 222 F.3d at 303.
See supra text accompanying notes 65-72.
85 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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remain in a contractual relationship to allege injuries within the "zone
of interests" protected by the statute. Since employment testers have
no intention to contract when applying for a job, their alleged injuries
do not fall within the "zone of interests" protected by § 1981. Conse-
quently, testers attempting recovery under § 1981 cannot surmount
the prudential barriers to standing under the statute and do not have
standing as a matter of law.
In addition, since the D.C. Circuit in Fair Employment Council
found that the testers did not have standing without addressing
whether § 1981 removed prudential barriers,86 one can only assume
that this court also recognized that this statute does not extend stand-
ing to the full limits of Article m1I. 87 If the D.C. Circuit believed that
§ 1981 did remove prudential barriers, then it seemingly would have
addressed the Article III requirements to determine standing, an in-
quiry the court did not make.
As a result, tester plaintiffs seeking recovery under § 1981 have
to survive an analysis of the prudential barriers to standing before
courts can even entertain an Article H analysis. Since tester plain-
tiffs cannot demonstrate that their injuries are within the "zone of in-
terests" protected by § 1981, testers do not have standing under the
statute. With recovery for employment testers foreclosed under
§ 1981, employment testers cannot recover for a company's failure to
offer to hire them unless they can prove standing in some other way,
perhaps under another federal statute. Employment testers, conse-
quently, have also focused their recovery efforts on Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
IV. EMPLOYMENT TESTER STANDING UNDER TrrLE VII
Title VII was enacted in 1964, nearly one hundred years after
§ 1981's enactment but before § 1981 was held to apply to private
discrimination.89 Title VII provides in pertinent part that it is unlaw-
ful for any employer to refuse to hire any individual for discrimina-
86 See supra text accompanying notes 65-68.
87 It is also arguable that the court believed the "zone of interests" prudential barrier can
never be removed from the standing analysis, possibly by elevating this requirement to an Arti-
cle III core requirement. See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
88 But see Michelle Landever, Note, Tester Standing in Employment Discrimination Cases
Under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 381, 406 (1993) (arguing that employment testers
should have standing under § 1981 "[gliven the substantial societal need to attack employment
discrimination").
89 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 173 (1976) (holding that a "consistent interpre-




tory reasons. 90 The Act also provides that any person claiming to be
aggrieved due to a violation of the statute may initiate a cause of ac-
tion in federal court.91 Shortly after its enactment, employment test-
ers92 who were refused employment turned to Title VII to seek recov-
ery for alleged hiring discrimination. As a result, federal courts had
to determine if testers could seek redress in a judicial forum.
A. Title WI and the Prudential Barriers to Standing
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,93 the Supreme
Court held that the statutory language "person claiming to be ag-
grieved" in the Fair Housing Act "showed 'a congressional intention
to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article R of the Con-
stitution."' 94 Similar language in Title VII95 eliminates the need for a
plaintiff to surmount the prudential barriers to standing.9 6  Conse-
quently, employment testers seemingly do not need to demonstrate
that the injuries they receive fall within the "zone of interests" pro-
90 See supra note 3 for the relevant language of Title VII.
9' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (c), (f)(1) (2000) (providing that "persons aggrieved" may
initiate suits).
92 Although some organizations fighting discrimination in the workplace later utilized
testers to fill an apparent enforcement void, tester cases filed before this void existed, shortly
after the enactment of Title VII, were filed by persons seeking to uncover discrimination on
their own. See, e.g., Lea v. Cone Mills, Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1971); Parr v. Wood-
men of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 657 F. Supp. 1022 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
9' 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
94 Id. at 209 (quoting Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 455 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 1971)).
Hackett actually involved 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a), a provision of Title VII. Therefore, the Su-
preme Court in Trafficante actually drew an analogy from the Third Circuit's interpretation of
language in Title VII to find that the same language in the Fair Housing Act extends standing to
the limits of Article II. Consequently, Trafficante provides a strong presumption that Title VII
also extends standing to the limits of Article III. Subsequent court decisions have embraced this
presumption. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
See supra note 91 for the relevant text of the statute.
96 See Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Serv., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2000) ("When Con-
gress confers such a broad right to sue, the judiciary may not close the doors to the courthouse
by invoking prudential considerations.") (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3
(1997)). Kyles found that since both statutes permit "any person aggrieved by a violation to file
a charge and suit, both reflect a congressional intent to extend standing to the fullest extent
permitted by Article III of the Constitution." Id at 297-98. See also Angelino v. New York
Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 91 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming its "view that the statutory language, 'per-
son claiming to be aggrieved,' implied a Congressional intent to be liberal in allowing suits that
effectuate the purposes of anti-discrimination statutes"); Stewart v. Harmon, 675 F.2d 846, 849
(7th Cir. 1982) ("A similar analysis of standing [extending standing to the limits of Article II]
should hold true under Title VII which, like [the Fair Housing Act], has the purpose of outlaw-
ing discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, and sex."); EEOC v. Mississippi
Coil., 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 1980) ("We agree with other circuits that have held that the
strong similarities between the language, design, and purposes of Title VII and the Fair Housing
Act require that the phrase 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' in... Title VII must be con-
strued in the same manner that Trafficante construed the term 'aggrieved person' in ... the Fair
Housing Act.").
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tected by Title VII. 97 A plaintiff invoking Title VII, therefore, need
only satisfy the Article II requirements to attain standing.98 While it
is safe to assume that testers meet the causation and redressability
requirements of Article Ell, it is uncertain that testers satisfy the "in-
jury in fact" requirement. Since injury is necessary to confer stand-
ing, having been termed the bedrock or core requirement of stand-
ing,99 testers must demonstrate that they have been injured in order to
have the merits of their claims addressed.
B. The Standing Cases
Interestingly, the first federal courts faced with employment tester
claims looked past the standing inquiry altogether. Instead, the early
tester cases brought under Title VII were decided on the merits.
100
Judges soon realized, however, that before examining the prima facie
case of an employment tester, they must first make the threshold de-
termination as to whether the tester has standing to sue. Significantly,
when limiting the inquiry to the tester's standing, the U.S. Courts of
Appeals have disagreed as to whether a tester has standing under Title
VII.
1. Fair Employment Council
As previously mentioned, Fair Employment Council was the first
case to address the issue of standing for employment testers. 10 1 The
district court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, de-
termining that the relevant inquiry is not "whether the plaintiffs made
'a bona fide expression of interest' in employment."' 1 2 The D.C. Cir-
cuit, however, reversed and granted the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment against the employment testers. 103
97 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, many courts conducting
standing inquiries under Title VII still require that the plaintiff's complaint be within the zone of
interests protected by Title VII, a prudential inquiry. Either these courts do not believe that
Title VII eliminates prudential barriers or they believe that the zone of interests inquiry rises to
the level of a core constitutional requirement for standing under Article I. See infra notes 200-
05 and accompanying text.
98 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
9 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (emphasizing injury in
fact as the "core component" and "essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy
requirement"); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) (characterizing injury as the bedrock principle of the standing
doctrine).
10o See infra notes 218-28 and accompanying text.101 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
102 Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 829 F. Supp.
402,405 (D.D.C. 1993).
103 Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268,
1281 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("As for the individual testers, they have not stated a cause of action
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Nevertheless, the court chose not to address defendant's argument
that plaintiffs must have a bona fide interest in employment in order
to have standing under Title VII, 104 reversing the district court's deci-
sion on other grounds. Specifically, the court relied on the defen-
dant's alternative argument that the testers do not have standing to sue
because there were no damages available to them under Title VII.
10 5
The court reasoned that since only equitable remedies were available
under Title VII prior to 1991,106 then the testers could not seek dam-
ages because the alleged discrimination they complained of happened
in 1990.107 Therefore, the only possible relief that the testers could
seek under Title VII was injunctive or declaratory relief,10 8 relief not
available to the testers because they failed to make "sufficient allega-
tions that they are threatened with any future illegality."'1 9 In other
words, the testers did not show that they met the necessary Article I
requirement that they will suffer "injury in fact." Consequently, the
testers did not have standing under Title VII.
2. Revisiting the D.C. Circuit's Decision in Fair Employment Council
Fortunately for the D.C. Circuit, it was able to escape the difficult
question, i.e., whether a plaintiff must be a bona fide job applicant to
have standing under Title VII, by finding narrower grounds to rule
against the testers' standing claims. Of course, had the 1991 amend-
ments applied to the testers' claims in Fair Employment Council, the
court would have needed to either adopt a different rationale for rul-
ing as it did or actually find that testers have standing under Title VII.
A later case, also brought in the District of Columbia, actually ad-
dressed the significance of the 1991 amendments even though Title
under § 1981, nor have they established standing to seek the only form of relief that might be
available to them under Title VII."). •
104 See Ud at 1272 n.1 (choosing not to decide whether "people who lack a bonafide inter-
est in employment-such as testers-lack any cause of action under [Title VII]").
3o5 See id.
106 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded the remedies available under Title VII to in-
clude damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2000) ("In an action brought by a complaining
party ... prohibited under Section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 or 2000e-3).
.. and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1981 of this title, the
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages ...").
0
7 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (holding that the remedial provi-
sions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 cannot be applied to conduct occurring before the enact-
ment of the 1991 statute).
108 See Fair Employment Council, 28 F.3d at 1272.
109 Ld. A plaintiff's standing to seek prospective relief depends on whether the plaintiff is
likely to suffer future injury resulting from the defendant's future conduct. See City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (holding that a plaintiff allegedly injured by a po-
liceman's chokehold had standing to seek injunctive relief only if "he was likely to suffer future
injury from the use of the chokeholds by police officers").
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VII was not even invoked by the plaintiff. In so doing, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals adopted a different rationale than that
used by the Fair Employment Council court, one that endorsed stand-
ing for testers under Title VII.
In Molovinsky v. Fair Employment Council of Greater Washing-
ton, Inc.,l l° a woman responding to an employment agency adver-
tisement complained to the Fair Employment Council that she was
sexually harassed in a job interview. I l' Two female testers later sent
to the agency by the Fair Employment Council also reported that they
were sexually harassed. 112 All three females brought suit under the
District of Columbia Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"). 113 The
Molovinsky court determined that the D.C. Circuit's Fair Employment
Council decision was not persuasive because Title VII did not author-
ize an award of damages, whereas the DCHRA did. Instead, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that testers had stand-
ing to bring suit under the DCHRA.
1 14
This case is pertinent to the standing discussion under Title VII
for three reasons. First, the DCHRA is almost identical to and in fact
modeled after Title VII. 115 Second, its remedy provisions most closely
resemble Title VII as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.116
Finally, the District of Columbia court relied almost exclusively on
the Supreme Court's decision in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman1
17
to conclude that employment testers have standing under the
DCHRA.
The fact that the DCHRA and Title VII are substantially similar
suggests that the D.C. Circuit's prior decision in Fair Employment
Council should control the outcome in Molovinsky, or at least the ra-
tionale used to determine that outcome. Nevertheless, the fact that the
DCHRA authorizes an award of damages for previous violations of
the Act precludes the application of the D.C. Circuit's methodology.
"0 683 A.2d 142 (D.C. 1996).
.. See id. at 144 ("Molovinsky told Henderson that if she would just 'give a little bit part
of [her] life,' he would give her 'the greatest deal of [her] life.' When Ms. Henderson asked
him what he meant, Molovinsky lowered his voice and said, 'Sex."').
112 See id. at 145.
"3 See D.C. Code § 1-2512(a) (1992) ("It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice to
do any of the following acts, wholly or partially for a discriminatory reason based upon the race,
color, religion, natural origin, [or] sex.., of any individual: ... (2) To fail or refuse to refer for
employment, or to classify or refer for employment, any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual ... ").
14 See Molovinsky, 683 A.2d at 146.
"5 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1994) of Title VII, supra note 3, with the relevant
portion of the DCHRA, D.C. Code § 1-2512(a) (1992), supra note 113.
116 See Molovinsky, 683 A.2d at 146 n.2 ("The 1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII to
provide for damages as a remedy for past violations, as does the DCHRA.") (emphasis added).
117 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
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Specifically, the Fair Employment Council decision pertained to
plaintiffs who were limited to seeking only injunctive or declaratory
relief.
The testers in Molovinsky, however, were not seeking this type of
relief, but were seeking damages authorized by the DCHRA." 8 Al-
though the D.C. Circuit's rationale in Fair Employment Council
would probably counsel against granting standing to testers seeking
injunctive or declaratory relief under the DCHRA, nothing in that
decision speaks to whether testers can maintain standing when seek-
ing damages.
This gap in the D.C. Circuit's decision also has profound effects
on the Title VII standing analysis. Since employment testers seeking
redress under Title VII for alleged violations occurring after 1991 are
seeking damages, it also would appear that the Fair Employment
Council methodology standing alone cannot preclude standing for
such testers.119 Therefore, the methodology that the Molovinsky court
relied on to determine if testers have standing under the DCHRA nec-
essarily will provide insight into the post-1991 Title VII standing in-
quiry. The Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Havens Realty supplies
the Molovinsky court's methodology since the court relied almost ex-
clusively on Havens Realty in finding that testers have standing under
the DCHRA.
In Havens Realty, a black tester was falsely told that housing in a
predominantly white apartment complex was not available. 120 The
Supreme Court found that the tester had standing under a section of
the Fair Housing Act that created the right "to truthful information
concerning the availability of housing.', 121  The broad reach of the
Fair Housing Act, the Supreme Court had already concluded, demon-
strates Congress' intent to remove the prudential standing rules as
,,8 See Molovinsky, 683 A.2d at 145 ("The jury returned a verdict against Molovinsky and
awarded damages to each of the plaintiffs.") (emphasis added).
119 See Robert Thomas Roos, Note, No Harm, No Fraud: The Invalidity of State Fraud
Claims Brought Against Employment Testers, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1687, 1704 (2000) ("Under
today's version of Title VII, the new remedies promulgated in the 1991 amendments are avail-
able to prospective plaintiffs, thus removing the impediment to standing that supported the
court's decision in Fair Employment Council.").
120 See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 368 n.4 ("Camelot Townhouses is an apartment com-
plex predominantly occupied by whites. Coles [the tester plaintiff] was informed that no apart-
ments were available in the Camelot complex. He was told that an apartment was available in
the adjoining Colonial Court Complex. The Colonial complex is integrated.").
121 Id. at 364. The section at issue, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (2000), provides that "it shall be
unlawful-[t]o represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling is in fact so
available." The Havens Realty Court recognized that "Congress' decision to confer a broad
right of truthful information concerning housing availability was undoubtedly influenced by
congressional awareness that the intentional provision of misinformation offered a means of
maintaining segregated housing." lId at 374 n.14 (White, J., concurring).
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contemplated by Warth v. Seldin.122 The Havens Court, however, did
not stop there. It further held that a tester who alleged a violation of
her statutory right to truthful housing information, as provided for in
the Fair Housing Act, satisfied the Article III requirement of injury in
fact.123 In finding that testers meet the Article III injury requirement,
the Court specifically relied on language in its previous Linda R.S. v.
Richard D. 124 and Warth decisions, which recognized that injury may
exist by virtue of statutes that create legal rights. 125
The Molovinsky court analogized the Fair Housing Act to the
DCHRA. First, the court found that the portions of both acts author-
izing persons to bring suit were virtually identical. 126 More signifi-
cant, however, the court concluded that, as in Havens Realty, the test-
ers satisfied the injury requirement automatically when they claimed a
violation of statutory rights under the DCHRA.127 In so doing, the
court recognized that although female testers had no intention of ac-
cepting an employment referral, this "d[id] not negate the simple fact
of injury within the meaning of [the DCHRA]." 128 The court con-
cluded that the testers met the Article III injury requirement and had
standing because "the statutory violation and accompanying injury
exist without respect to the testers' intentions in initiating the encoun-
ters."
129
Thus, the Molovinsky court's reliance on Havens Realty ushered
in the idea that employment testers automatically meet the Article III
injury requirement so long as they bring an action under a statute that
creates broad legal rights, such as Title VII. Furthermore, the deci-
sion illuminated the limitations of the D.C. Circuit's Fair Employ-
ment Council decision, which cannot apply to alleged violations oc-
curring after the enactment of the 1991 amendments to Title VII au-
thorizing money damages. Nevertheless, as the 1990s came to end,
the D.C. Circuit was still the only circuit court to address standing for
employment testers and had ruled against them. Finally, in the sum-
122 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
123 See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373-74 (White, J., concurring) ("A tester who has been
the object of a misrepresentation made unlawful under § 804(d) has suffered injury in precisely
the form the statute was intended to guard against, and therefore has standing to maintain a
claim for damages under the Act's provisions.").
124 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
125 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
126 Compare D.C. Code § 1-2556(a) (1992) (allowing "[any person claiming to be ag-
grieved" to bring suit under the DCHRA) with 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2000) (allowing "any person
who claims to have been injured" to bring suit under the Fair Housing Act).
127 See Molovinsky, 683 A.2d at 146 ("As in Havens, the injury to their rights was direct
and personal.").




mer of 2000, another circuit court addressed standing for employment
testers.
In Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Security Services, Inc.,3° the Seventh
Circuit parted ways with the D.C. Circuit while embracing the Ha-
vens Realty methodology relied on in Molovinsky. The Kyles court
examined the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fair Housing Act,
and found that the Act automatically creates substantive rights "the
denial of which alone gives rise to a cognizable injury and the right to
sue."131 The court also stated that the tester in Havens Realty "suf-
fer[ed] an injury notwithstanding the fact that she was not actually in
need or desire of housing." 132 In other words, the statute itself con-
ferred standing on a tester "even if the [tester] does not suffer the type
of core injury that the statute protects. 133
Similar to Molovinsky, the Kyles court then analogized the Fair
Housing Act to Title VII. For example, the court pointed out that the
Fair Housing Act, just like Title VII, authorizes "any person" who is
aggrieved by a statutory violation to bring suit.
134
The court also explained that the Fair Housing Act and Title VII
should be "given like construction and application" because they are
"functional equivalent[s]" of one another. 135 After conducting a re-
view of Havens Realty, the Kyles court then concluded that employ-
ment testers also satisfy the Article III injury requirement as housing
136testers do under the Fair Housing Act. Consequently, the court
ruled that employment testers have standing under Title VII.
The Molovinsky and Kyles departure from the D.C. Circuit's deci-
sion in Fair Employment Council suggests that, unlike § 1981, the
primary motive of plaintiffs should not enter the standing analysis
under Title VII. Taken to its logical conclusion, the fact that courts
addressing standing have chosen to discount the motive of the plain-
tiff in "applying" for jobs suggests that tester plaintiffs may have
standing. The following analysis, however, challenges this conclu-
130 222 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2000). As previously mentioned, the Seventh Circuit in Kyles
agreed with the D.C. Circuit's decision in Fair Employment Council that testers do not have
standing under § 1981. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
131 Kyles, 222 F.3d at 303.
3 id.
133 Id
134 See id at 297-98 (explaining that both statutes authorize "any person aggrieved by a
violation to file charge and suit"). See Molovinsky, 683 A.2d at 146 (making the same compari-
son between the Fair Housing Act and the DHCRA, a statute modeled after Title VII).
135 Kyles, 222 F.3d at 295. See also iL at 297 (explaining that "[bloth [statutes] take broad
aim at discrimination in their respective sectors and in that sense are the functional equivalents
of one another").
136 See i. at 300 ("In this case, Kyles and Pierce have asserted the injury-in-fact that Arti-
cle I requires.").
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sion and suggests that the primary motive of a plaintiff bringing an
action under Title VII may be important to the standing inquiry.
C. Obstacles to Standing Under Title VII
As previously discussed, the Havens Realty decision gave hous-
ing testers standing to bring suit under the Fair Housing Act. 137 The
main rationale leading to this conclusion was the Supreme Court's
interpretation in Havens Realty of its previous language appearing in
Linda R.S., i.e., the "injury in fact" requirement of Article III "may
exist solely by virtue of 'statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing." 138 Essentially, the Havens Realty Court took
this language to mean that the "injury in fact" requirement is satisfied
automatically when a plaintiff invokes a federal statute creating a le-
gal right, even when the plaintiff may not have suffered any injury
otherwise. 
139
Therefore, a strong argument emerges in favor of employment
tester standing under Title VII. So long as Title VII creates legal
rights, employment testers have standing to sue in exactly the same
way that housing testers have standing under the Fair Housing Act. 140
The fact that Title VII is extremely similar to the Fair Housing Act
suggests that Title VII extends standing to the full extent of the Con-
stitution, eliminating the need to surmount the prudential barriers to
standing. 141 This similarity also suggests that Title VII creates legal
rights and that the "injury in fact" requirement is satisfied by anyone
bringing suit under this statute, even testers.1 42 Consequently, the
Havens Realty decision, standing alone, supports the conclusion that
employment testers have standing under Title VII.
Supreme Court and other federal court jurisprudence, however,
challenge this conclusion. First, the Havens Realty Court's interpreta-
tion of the "injury in fact" requirement may have been modified re-
cently by the Supreme Court. Second, the analogy between Title VII
137 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
38 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614,617 (1973)).
139 See Kyles, 222 F.3d at 296 (explaining that through § 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act,
"Congress had created a legal right, the denial of which would, in and of itself, give rise to the
type of injury necessary to establish standing in conformance with Article III"). See also Mi-
chael Rosman, Standing Alone: Standing Under the Fair Housing Act, 60 Mo. L. REV. 547, 582
n.158 (1995) ("Linda R.S. strongly suggests that some 'injuries' under a statute would not be
injuries at all.").
140 This is the argument proffered by some academics. See, e.g., Steven G. Anderson,
Tester Standing Under Title VII: A Rose by Any Other Name, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1217 (1992)
(concluding that employment testers have standing under Title VII); Shannon E. Brown, Tester
Standing Under Title VI, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1117 (1992) (same).
141 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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and the Fair Housing Act may not be proper with respect to the elimi-
nation of prudential barriers and the breadth of the rights protected
under Title VII. Finally, cases involving employment testers that
have been decided on the merits suggest that testers may need to be
bona fide applicants in order to have standing. It is imperative, there-
fore, to examine this jurisprudence to see how it affects standing for
testers under Title VII. This review will demonstrate that employ-
ment testers may not have standing under Title VII if they cannot
demonstrate an "injury in fact 143 separate from the "injury" resulting
solely from the violation of Title VII. Furthermore, standing may be
precluded if the Fair Housing Act cannot be analogized to Title VII.
1. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and the Injury Battle
In 1992, the Supreme Court clarified, or perhaps further mud-
dled, what constitutes the Article I requirement of "injury in fact."
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,144 the Supreme Court held that the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA") did not automatically confer stand-
ing on plaintiffs even though a provision of the statute permits "any
person" to commence a civil suit to enjoin anyone violating the stat-
ute.145 In supporting this conclusion, the Lujan Court held that in de-
fining "injury," Congress could create only Article II de jure injuries
from previously existing de facto injuries.146 In other words, accord-
ing to the Lujan methodology, Congress cannot create legal rights
automatically satisfying the Article II injury requirement. 147 Instead,
a court must separately inquire as to whether the plaintiff invoking
rights under a federal statute suffered an injury "if not actual, then at
least imminent.
''148
143 To clarify what is meant by "injury in fact," Rosman looks beyond words used by the
Supreme Court, which include "distinct," "palpable" and "not abstract," relying instead on
"utilitarian injury." Rosman describes a "utilitarian injury" as "one which leaves a person worse
off than he was previously, i.e., one which reduces his or her 'utility."' Rosman, supra note
139, at 566. He also makes the point that an "injury in fact" is different from a "legal injury,"
which was the standard for determining the Article III injury requirement prior to 1970. Id. at
553.
'4 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
141 Id. at 578.
146 See id. at 578 (explaining that the cases relied on by the Supreme Court in developing
the Linda RS. approach "involved Congress' elevating to the status of legally cognizable inju-
ries concrete, defacto injuries that were previously inadequate in law").
147 This portion of Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lujan was foreshadowed by a lec-
ture he gave in 1983. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 886 (1983) (arguing that "there is a limit
upon even the power of Congress to convert generalized benefits into legal rights-and that is
the limitation imposed by the so-called "core" requirement"). Whether or not Justice Scalia and
the Lujan majority meant this limitation to apply only to generalized grievances against the
Government rather than to private suits against defendants is not clear.
148 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2.
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On its face, the Lujan decision seems to ignore the Court's pre-
vious pronouncement in Linda R.S. and later in Warth, that the "in-
jury in fact" requirement of Article III can be satisfied by statutes that
create legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing. 149 For ex-
ample, Congress explicitly gave any person the ability to bring suit
against anyone violating the ESA. 150 Under the Linda R.S. approach,
the ESA seems to qualify as a statute that creates legal rights for all
persons to bring suit against violators. Therefore, any person bring-
ing suit to enforce the statute should automatically satisfy the Article
II injury requirement.151 Since the creation of these legal rights may
also demonstrate Congress' intent to remove prudential barriers to
standing, the Linda R.S. approach may narrow the standing require-
ments for plaintiffs bringing suit under this provision of the ESA to
the remaining two Article III requirements-causation and redress-
ability. 1
52
A closer examination of Supreme Court jurisprudence, however,
demonstrates that Lujan may not disrupt the Linda R.S. approach.
First, one academic has noted that "[t]he underlying supposition of
Warth is that there are actual, particularized injuries which simply do
not cut it as Article III injuries-in-fact without the assistance of a stat-
ute.'153 The argument is that the Linda R.S. and Warth Courts' lan-
guage, regarding the creation of statutory rights, the invasion of
which creates standing, applies only to persons whose injuries previ-
ously could not be redressed at common law or under the Constitu-
tion. 154 Conversely, this language would not apply to plaintiffs, like
those in Lujan, whose sole claim to injury is a violation of a federal
statute.
This argument is supported by the Supreme Court's previous pro-
nouncement in Sierra Club v. Morton 55 that "[statutory] broadening
[of] the categories of injury that may be alleged in support of standing
is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party
seeking review must himself have suffered injury." 156 It is also sup-
ported by language in Lujan itself, pointing out that "[b]oth of the
149 See Rosman, supra note 139, at 581 (commenting that "the opinion in [Lujan] appears
to be inconsistent with language in certain earlier opinions," including Linda R.S.).
15o See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000) (the pertinent portion of this section provides that "any
person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to enjoin any person, including the
United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency.., who is alleged to be in
violation of any provision of this chapter").
151 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
52 See supra notes 37 and 38 and accompanying text.
53 Rosman, supra note 139, at 573.
54 See supra note 146 and infra note 158.




cases 157 used by [Linda R.S.] as an illustration of that principle in-
volved Congress' elevating to the status of legally cognizable injuries
concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.' 58
Consequently, Congress can automatically make an injury resulting
from the violation of a statutory right satisfy the Article III injury re-
quirement only if a violation of that right would cause an actual injury
without the assistance of the statute.
159
Second, the Court has continually held that the Article III stand-
ing requirements must be satisfied in order to gain standing and that
these requirements cannot be eliminated or abrogated by an act of
Congress. 6° Lujan's holding that persons do not meet the Article Il
injury requirement merely by invoking a federal statute creating legal
rights reinforces this enduring principle of standing. On the other
hand, the Havens Realty Court's holding may contradict this principle
by simply relying on Congress' grant of a broad right to truthful in-
formation, through the Fair Housing Act, as the sole requisite for the
Article I injury requirement.1 6' Relying on the notion that Congress
cannot abrogate standing reqfiirements, however, suggests that the
Havens Realty Court may have needed to conduct an independent
inquiry into whether the testers suffered an actual or utilitarian injury
rather than solely giving effect to the words of Congress.1 62
Finally, the Supreme Court views the Article IT injury require-
ment as a factual determination rather than a legal inquiry. Prior to
1970, the Court utilized the "legal interest" test to determine if a
plaintiff satisfied the injury requirement of Article H.163 In Associa-
157 The two cases relied on by the Linda R.S. Court were Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), and Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968). In
Trafficante, the concrete injury previously inadequate in law was "the loss of important benefits
from interracial associations." Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210. The injury in Hardin was eco-
nomic injury resulting from the violation of a statutory provision aimed at "protect[ing] private
utilities from TVA competition.' Hardin, 390 U.S. at 6.
13' Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992). See also Rosman, supra note
139, at 580.
159 Rosman, supra note 139, at 580. Rosman explains that "[t]he statutory assistance is to
create a 'right' not to be injured in ways that the Constitution and/or the common law do not
recognize." Id. at 573.
'6 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
162 Michael Rosman, commenting on Havens Realty, explains that "the Court did not look
for any utilitarian injury" or "look for any 'adverse consequence' or injury" or even "determine
whether the testers were worse off in some factual sense." Rosman, supra note 139, at 576. He
went on to conclude that when determining standing for "common law claims like fraudulent
inducement, we normally require plaintiffs to show that they relied on the false information,
because, without such a showing, it seems unlikely that the plaintiff suffered injury. As inter-
preted in Havens Realty, section 3604(d) eliminates that requirement." I&a
163 See, e.g., Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939) (denying
the competitor's standing and holding that they did not have the status "unless the right invaded
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tion of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,164 how-
ever, the Court disavowed the "legal interest" test, asking instead
"whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused
him injury in fact, economic or otherwise." 165 The Court's rationale
for this switch was that the legal interest of the plaintiff determines
the merits of his case rather than whether or not he has standing.'66
Data Processing suggests that even though testers may have a legal
interest emanating from Title VII, the legal significance of this possi-
ble interest does not bear directly on the standing analysis.' 67
Lujan can be viewed as reconciling the Linda R.S. Court's notion
of Congress' ability to create legal rights, the violation of which con-
fers standing, with prior Supreme Court jurisprudence holding that
the Article III injury requirement is determined through a factual in-
quiry that cannot be eliminated by Congress. Specifically, Congress
can create legal rights that did not exist previously under the law.
Nevertheless, the injury resulting from a violation of these rights must
be an actual, concrete injury in order to satisfy the Article m re-
quirement of injury in fact. Congress cannot simply abrogate this
requirement by enabling the violation of a statutory right to automati-
cally give someone claiming that right standing. Rather, a separate
inquiry must be made by a court to determine if an actual injury oc-
curred to the plaintiff when the statutory right that he invokes was
violated.
This reading of Lujan may have grave consequences for the
standing of testers under the Fair Housing Act. In Havens Realty, the
Court did not make an independent inquiry as to whether the testers
had suffered any injury apart from the violation of the right they
claimed under the Act.168 Following the Lujan precedent, however,
would seem to require such an independent inquiry to determine if the
testers had suffered an Article m injury. Therefore, these testers must
is a legal right, one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious inva-
sion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege").
164 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
165 Id. at 152. See also Rosman, supra note 139, at 553 (explaining that "the 'legal injury'
test was expanded in the post World War II era, until it was abandoned in [Data Processing]").
'66 See Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
167 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions are consistent with this concept. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992) ("But the 'injury in fact' test requires more
than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself
among the injured.") (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972)). Neverthe-
less, Cass Sunstein and other academics have been highly critical of the Data Processing hold-
ing and argue that the injury in fact inquiry should be abandoned in favor of a return to the pre-
Data Processing legal interest test. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of
Citizen Suits, "Injuries, " and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 222 (1992) (explaining that
"the real source of current difficulty is Data Processing, which diverted attention from the rele-
vant question of cause of action to the irrelevant question of injury in fact").
168 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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show that they suffered an injury in addition to demonstrating that
they did not receive truthful information as the statute provides. Pre-
suming that these testers did not receive such an injury,169 testers
would not be able to satisfy the Article H requirements for standing
under the Fair Housing Act.
This view of Lujan's effect on Havens Realty and tester standing
under the Fair Housing Act would render meaningless the analogy
that the Molovinsky and Kyles courts constructed to demonstrate that
employment testers meet the injury requirement for standing under
Title VII. Specifically, a mere violation of the Fair Housing Act
would not automatically supply the injury requirement for housing
testers. Assuming, as Molovinsky and Kyles have assumed, that the
Fair Housing Act is properly analogized to Title VII, a mere violation
of Title VII similarly would not supply the injury requirement for
employment testers. 170 A number of academics have agreed that this
is the proper reading of Lujan.171 Nevertheless, many disagree that
Lujan represents the proper approach to the standing inquiry. 172
Although Lujan may present a formidable obstacle precluding
standing for employment testers under Title VII, it nevertheless may
169 Not only is it possible that these testers did not receive an injury, they may even have
benefited from the failure to receive truthful information. See, e.g., United States v. Balistrieri,
981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992) ("In fact, a tester who helps expose discrimination could
conceivably experience certain satisfaction in helping to correct wrongful conduct. Some testers
could even be pleased with the success of their undercover operations.'); Rosman, supra note
139, at 576-77 ('The tester, in general, is an individual committed to eradicating discrimination
from the field of housing, and may truly believe that the persons being 'tested' engage in illegal
discrimination but have yet to be detected. It is not altogether unreasonable to assume that a
tester might be elated or receive some other form of 'mental joy'-or whatever the name for the
opposite of mental distress is-upon learning that his or her efforts have contributed to the
ferreting out of evil.").
170 But see Robert G. Schwemm, Standing to Sue in Fair Housing Cases, 41 OHIo ST. LJ.
1, 53 (1980) (observing that it is unlikely "the Court will ever hold that a plaintiff's injury is
covered by [the Fair Housing Act] but that it is inadequate to meet article III requirements").
171 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DuKE
LJ. 1141, 1158 n.125 (1993) ("Under the Defenders methodology, however, the tester actually
would have nothing at stake."); Rosman, supra note 139, at 581 (explainng that "[t]he conse-
quences of [Lujan] would be particularly severe for the Fair Housing Act" and that Lujan is
"difficult to reconcile with the holding of Havens Realty"). Rosman also referred to Nichol's
article, stating that "[a]s Dean Nichol has noted, it does not seem that black testers like those in
Havens Realty would have standing if Scalia's opinion in Defenders becomes the standard ana-
lytic framework for statutory standing." Id. See also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders
of WIldiife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE LJ. 1170,
1179 (1993) (arguing that "the results of the Court's prior statutory standing cases are in grave
doubt"); Sunstein, supra note 167, at 230 n.296 (explaining that the Court's decision in Lujan
could not be reconciled with Havens Realty since both cases involved similar congressionally
created property interests).
172 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 167, at 236 ("Despite the holding of Lujan, Congress
should be permitted to grant standing to citizens."). Sunstein also commented that "[t]he Lujan
Court's unprecedented invalidation of a provision for citizen standing has no basis in Article
ll1." Id.
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serve as a harmless mirage. For example, Lujan is distinguishable
from tester cases under Title VII based on the nature of the injuries
and the parties involved. Lujan specifically addresses suits claiming
procedural injury arising from government conduct that is not accom-
panied by a deprivation of liberty or property. Tester suits under Title
VII, on the other hand, involve markedly different claims of alleged
personal discrimination arising from the conduct of a private defen-
dant. Consequently, an inference can be made that these distinctions
require different analytical frameworks for determining standing. 73
This inference is magnified by previous Supreme Court decisions
announcing that "'assertion of a right to a particular kind of govern-
ment conduct, which the government has violated by acting differ-
ently, cannot alone satisfy the requirements of Art. III without drain-
ing those requirements of meaning."' 174 Consequently, the breadth of
Lujan's application may appropriately be limited to "generalized
grievances" against the government. 175 If so limited, Lujan may give
rise to the presumption that a broader reading of Warth, finding injury
solely on the basis of a statutory violation, is permitted or even re-
quired when the government is not itself a defendant, as in employ-
ment tester cases against private defendants. Consequently, the Fair
Housing Act cases would remain unaffected by Lujan and the Act's
analogy to Title VII still could serve as a persuasive argument in fa-
vor of employment tester standing.
Another factor diminishing Lujan's effect on tester standing is the
argument that Warth actually does permit Congress to create legally
cognizable injuries that previously were not adequate in law. Support
for this argument can be found in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in
Lujan. Justice Kennedy disagreed with Justice Scalia's interpretation
of Warth, announcing that "Congress has the power to define injuries
and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or con-
troversy where none existed before." 176 Nevertheless, Justice Ken-
nedy qualified this power, requiring that "Congress must at least iden-
tify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of
persons entitled to bring suit. ' 177 The citizen-suit provision of the
ESA, however, did not define the injury resulting from a violation of
the Act. Consequently, Justice Kennedy concluded that this provision
173 But see Sunstein, supra note 167, at 232 ("After Lujan, the citizen-suit provisions are
probably unconstitutional even when the defendant is a private citizen or corporation.").
174 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1983) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,483 (1982)).
'75 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.




"does not of its own force establish that there is an injury in 'any per-
son' by virtue of any 'violation.'
178
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, joined by Justice Souter, "does
not limit the injuries that Congress could define to pre-existing de
facto injuries. ' 179 Rather, Justice Kennedy "merely wanted a clear
statement of what the injury is."180 This concurrence is particularly
relevant to ascertaining the proper interpretation of the Linda R.S. (or
Warth) statutory rights scheme "because without [Justice Kennedy]
and Justice Souter, Justice Scalia's opinion would have lacked a ma-
jority. ' '
18l
Unlike Justice Scalia's opinion, Justice Kennedy's qualified view
that Congress can define injuries previously inadequate at law argua-
bly is consistent with the rationale supporting the Havens Realty deci-
sion. Although section 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act is not particu-
larly clear about the specific injury resulting from a violation of the
right to truthful information, the class of persons affected by the vio-
lation is limited to a specific class of right-holders. Rather than a
generalized grievance authorizing all citizens from seeing that the law
is obeyed, 182 this section specifically permits persons prevented from
obtaining housing through deception to seek redress. 83  Therefore,
under Kennedy's interpretation of statutory rights, the housing testers
may automatically satisfy the Article III injury requirement merely by
claiming a violation of section 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act.
Consequently, Lujan may not render meaningless the analogy that
Molovinsky and Kyles have drawn between the Fair Housing Act and
Title VII. First, it is arguable that the application of Lujan is properly
limited to generalized grievances brought against the government,
rather then tester suits brought against private defendants. Further-
more, although Justice Scalia's interpretation of statutory rights may
conflict with Havens Realty and gravely affect standing for testers
under either the Fair Housing Act or Title VII, Justice Kennedy's
methodology leaves the Havens Realty decision unscathed. Since
Justices Kennedy and Souter are currently the swing votes on this
issue, the prior Fair Housing Act jurisprudence may remain unmo-
178 d.
179 Rosman, supra note 139, at 583.
is0 Id.
'8' Id. at 582.
182 Another distinguishing characteristic of Lujan is whether Congress has usurped execu-
tive power by authorizing citizen suits. This question raises separation of powers issues that
may or may not be present in tester cases, or at least, are not as prevalent in cases where the
class authorized to enforce the statutory violation is limited, as in tester cases. For a further
discussion of the links between standing doctrine and separation of powers issues, see Scalia,
supra note 147, at 890-97.
183 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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lested after Lujan. Consequently, so long as employment testers are
able to persuasively analogize the Fair Housing Act to Title VII, then
testers have a strong argument in favor of standing.
Nevertheless, the important conclusion drawn from an analysis of
Lujan and statutory rights is that the ambiguity of Supreme Court ju-
risprudence on this matter makes it far less than clear that testers can
claim Article III injury based solely on a violation of a right created
by Congress. Consequently, since standing for housing testers under
the Fair Housing Act is no longer a foregone conclusion after Lujan,
standing for employment testers similarly may be jeopardized.
2. Breadth of Rights, Elimination of Prudential Barriers, and the
Fair Housing Act Analogy
Even if the Fair Housing Act survives a statutory rights challenge,
the analogy between it and Title VII may be flawed, precluding a
finding of standing for employment testers under Title VII. For ex-
ample, Molovinsky and Kyles pointed to specific language in the Fair
Housing Act granting testers a cause of action. 184 These courts found
standing for employment testers by relying on the presumption that
Title VII similarly supplies a cause of action for testers. 185  An ex-
amination of the relevant language of Title VII, however, reveals dif-
ferences between it and the language granting testers a cause of action
under the Fair Housing Act. Consequently, the presumption that Title
VII protects employment testers from discrimination is susceptible to
challenge.
As previously mentioned, section 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act
makes it unlawful "[t]o represent to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin that any
dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such
dwelling is in fact so available."1 86 The Havens Realty Court con-
cluded that this section gives testers a cause of action since it "con-
184 The specific language is encompassed by 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d), also known as § 804(d)
of the Fair Housing Act. See infra text accompanying note 186.
1s5 See Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Serv., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 298 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that
an employment tester has standing under Title VII since she "suffers an injury 'in precisely the
form the statute was intended to guard against,' just as she would if, as a housing tester, she
were falsely informed that a vacant apartment was unavailable") (quoting Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982)); Molovinsky, 683 A.2d at 146 ("In Havens the Supreme
Court held that a tester who alleged a violation of her statutory right to truthful housing informa-
tion satisfied the Article III requirement of injury in fact. The plaintiff testers in this case al-
leged a violation of their statutory right to be free from sexual harassment. As in Havens, the
injury to their rights was direct and personal.") (citation and footnote omitted).
186 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (2000).
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fer[s] on all 'persons' a legal right to truthful information about avail-
able housing."
187
No analogous language appears anywhere in Title VII. 188  In
other words, Title VII does not specifically provide a cause of action
for misrepresentations made to any person because of his race or
other legally irrelevant factor. Congress, therefore, has not created a
broad right to truthful information under Title VII as it has under the
Fair Housing Act. Since the right housing testers have sued under is
not available under Title VII, the analogy between the Fair Housing
Act and Title VII lacks complete symmetry. Although both statutes
were enacted to combat discrimination, 189 they adopt different means
by which to accomplish this overarching goal. Employment testers,
therefore, cannot argue that because housing testers have standing
under a certain provision of the Fair Housing Act, they necessarily
have standing under dissimilar provisions of Title VII. 19° Conse-
quently, an argument can be made that whatever the extent of con-
gressional power to create causes of action for testers under Article
m, Congress has simply failed to do so in Title VII.
Before reaching this conclusion, however, it is entirely possible
that Title VII contains other provisions that independently give em-
ployment testers a cause of action. Such provisions would obviate the
need to draw an analogy to the Fair Housing Act for the purpose of
locating a cause of action for employment testers, thereby eliminating
the difficulty presented by the absence of a right to truthful informa-
tion under Title VII. The provisions employment testers have relied
on are 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b). The
first applies to employers and makes race or sex-based refusals to hire
unlawful,191 while the second refers to employment agencies and
makes race or sex-based refusals to refer for employment unlawful.
192
These provisions, however, do not grant a right as broad as that
granted under 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act. For example, while it
is clear that the Fair Housing Act's right to truthful information does
187 Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982). The Court explained that
Congress conferred such a broad right in order to combat housing discrimination. See id. at 374
n.14 ("Congress' decision to confer a broad right of truthful information concerning housing
availability was undoubtedly influenced by congressional awareness that the intentional provi-
sion of misinformation offered a means of maintaining segregated housing.").
"s See Kyles, 222 F.3d at 297 ("Title VII contains no provision comparable to section
804(d) of the Fair Housing Act."); Kyles v. J.K. Guardian See. Servs., Inc., No. 97-C-8311,
1998 WL 677165, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 1998) (explaining that "[a]lthough courts have rec-
ognized the standing of testers under the Fair Housing Act, the rights created by that statute are
different from the rights created by Title VII").
189 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
.90 For a discussion of these provisions, see infra text accompanying notes 191-92.
191 See supra note 3.
192 See supra note 3.
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not require a bona fide housing applicant, the same cannot be said of
the Title VII provisions. Havens Realty interpreted the reach of sec-
tion 804(d) by relying on the structure of the Act as a whole, specifi-
cally pointing to another provision of the Act requiring a bona fide
applicant. 193 The court concluded that since section 804(d) does not
similarly require a bona fide applicant, then the right to truthful in-
formation applies to housing testers. 194 Courts, however, cannot rely
on the same analysis with respect to the relevant Title VII provisions
since no other provisions in Title VII explicitly require a bona fide
applicant. Consequently, an inference arises suggesting that, unlike
the Fair Housing Act, Title VII requires a bona fide applicant. 195
Nevertheless, both Title VII provisions may grant a cause of ac-
tion to non-bona fide applicants, including employment testers. For
example, once an employer or an employment agency refuses to em-
ploy or refer a tester, it is arguable that his right to be free from such
refusals based on his race or other prohibited factor has been impli-
cated. As mentioned above, Title VII does not explicitly require that
a person have an actual desire to work for the employer or obtain a
referral from an employment agency in order to bring suit under the
statute. Consequently, these provisions may provide rights to em-
ployment testers that, at the very least, should not preempt conducting
an Article III standing analysis for testers.
In addition, whether or not testers have a cause of action may
only represent a question on the merits, which need not be clearly
ascertained to grant them standing. 196 This argument can work only if
courts continue to apply the injury in fact inquiry announced in Data
Processing. 197 If, as many academics advocate, the pre-Data Process-
ing legal interest test is reestablished, then the existence of a cause of
'9' See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000) (providing that "it shall be unlawful-(a) To refuse to
sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of,
or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin").
194 See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 374 ("Whereas Congress, in prohibiting discriminatory
refusals to sell or rent in § 804(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), required that there be a 'bona
fide offer' to rent or purchase, Congress plainly omitted any such requirement insofar as it
banned discriminatory representations in § 804(d).") (footnote omitted).
195 Of course, an opposite inference may also be created by the congressional silence in
Title VII with respect to bona fide applicants, i.e., if Congress intended for the bona fide appli-
cant requirement, it would have explicitly addressed it in Title VII, as it had in § 804(a) of the
Fair Housing Act. Nevertheless, courts addressing the merits of employment tester claims have
concluded that only a bona fide applicant may recover under Title VII. Rather than relying on
the structure of Title VII, however, these courts have relied on the failure of testers to establish
one of the prima facie elements. See infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
196 See Fry v. UAL Corp., 84 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that when the
rights conferred by a statute are not clear, "the question whether a particular class is protected
by it becomes just another issue concerning the merits of the suit").
197 See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 52:753
2002] EMPLOYMENT TESTERS 785
action becomes essential to the Article Ir injury inquiry.198 In other
words, the merits of the case become more closely merged with the
standing inquiry. Consequently, a failure to state a cause of action
would forestall any possible legal avenues available to employment
testers under Title VII.
The Fair Housing Act/Title VII analogy also may be flawed with
respect to the elimination of prudential barriers to standing. The Fair
Housing Act extends standing to the limits of Article I, eliminating
any court-imposed prudential barriers to standing.199 Courts have re-
lied on the Fair Housing Act to find that Title VII has also eliminated
prudential barriers.20 Nevertheless, other courts, including the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, have been reluctant to eliminate these barriers to
standing under Title VII.2 1 Furthermore, the leading treatise on em-
ployment discrimination refers to the "zone of interests" test as a core
Article I standing requirement.7
The tendency of courts to continue to apply a "zone of interests"
analysis to actions brought under Title VII is not surprising. Al-
though statutes may eliminate prudential barriers to standing, it is dif-
ficult to fathom elimination of the "zone of interest" barrier. This is
because it seems counterintuitive for statutes to protect interests that
198 See, e.g., Rosman, supra note 139, at 553-54 ("The critics of modem standing doctrine,
for the most part, seem to agree that the 'legal interest' test had more going for it than current
doctrine. In any standing case, they say, the question should really be whether the positive law
upon which the plaintiff bases his or her claim grants that plaintiff the right to sue."); Sunstein,
supra note 167, at 222 ("With respect to standing in general, the key question is whether Con-
gress... has created a cause of action. Without a cause of action, there is no standing; there is
no case or controversy; and courts are without authority to hear the case under Article III.");
Yelnosky, supra note 8, at 418-19 ("When a plaintiff seeks to enforce an interest that is pro-
tected by statute, asking whether that plaintiff has standing is the same as asking whether that
plaintiff has a claim on the merits.").
199 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
2w See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
201 See Clayton v. WhiteHall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676,679 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that
standing under Title VII is a two-part standard consisting of injury "in fact" and an injury within
the zone of interests of the statute); Pecorella v. Oak Orchard Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc., 559 F.
Supp. 147, 149 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that a male plaintiff who received a higher wage than
his female counterparts, on the condition that he not disclose his higher wage to his co-workers,
was not within the "zone of interests" of Title VII and thus did not have standing), aft'd, 722
F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO v.
Nassau County, 664 F. Supp. 64, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that men holding traditional
female jobs lacked standing because "these injuries and rights do not place them within the Title
VII zone of interests"); Feng v. Sandrik, 636 F. Supp. 77, 82 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that a
assistant professor's husband allegedly discriminated against by a university and who made
"broad allegations regarding injuries he has suffered" was outside the "zone of interests" of
Title VII and lacked standing).
2(n See Rosman, supra note 139, at 565 ("Perhaps the leading treatise on employment
discrimination, in listing the three elements of Article III standing, includes the prudential 'zone
of interests' test, and throughout its brief discussion on standing, repeatedly refers unquestion-
ingly to cases that applied the 'zone of interests' test.") (referring to ARTHUR LARSON & LEx
LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (1993) as the "leading treatise").
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were never intended for the statute to protect, a distinct possibility if a
statute eliminates the "zone of interests" requirement. This improb-
ability is compounded by the preposterous inquiry left for the courts.
Specifically, in order to determine if Congress intended to ignore its
own intent, courts must examine the intent of Congress in enacting
the particular statute at issue.2°3 Consequently, employment testers
may have to establish that Title VII not only protects the interests of
bona fide applicants, but that it protects their interests as well. With-
out any express language exhibiting congressional intent to encom-
pass testers, Title VII may arguably only protect bona fide appli-
cants. 2°4 In fact, the only courts addressing the merits of employment
tester claims, with the exception of Kyles,205 interpret Title VII as re-
quiring bona fide applicants.
206
V. SHOULD EMPLOYMENT TESTERS HAVE STANDING?
A. Filling the Enforcement Void, the Goals of Title VII, and
Organizational Standing
Even if employment testers are able to surmount the various ob-
stacles to standing under Title VII, granting employment testers
standing will in no way provide a panacea against hiring discrimina-
tion.2 07 Title VII was intended to and is written to take aim at a wide
range of discriminatory practices. 20 8  "The efficacy of Title VII de-
pends in part on the willingness and ability of individuals to bring
private suits challenging discriminatory employment practices."' 209 It
is unlikely, however, that employment testers will fill the Title VII
enforcement void21 and contribute to the efficacy of Title VII by
seeking redress for alleged hiring discrimination.
203 See Rosman, supra note 139, at 557 ("It is rather odd to say that Congress intended to
eliminate the 'prudential' tests. With respect to the zone of interests test, this means that Con-
gress meant to eliminate any inquiry into its own intent as to who should have standing. More-
over, as discussed below, Congress' intent to ignore its own intent is apparently gleaned by
examining its intent.").
204 But see supra note 195.
205 See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
206 See infra notes 219-29 and accompanying text.
207 In fact, some believe that Title VII is not even the proper instrument to combat hiring
discrimination. See, e.g., Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title Vii's Regulatory Regime: Rights,
Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REv. 375, 386 (1995) (concluding that "Title VII is not and
should not be viewed as a fundamental weapon which will transform or even marginally change
the demographics of this nation's workplaces"). Obviously, adopting this view would eliminate
the rationale of extending standing to employment testers to fill the enforcement void under
Title VII.
208 See Kyles v. J.K. Guardian See. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289,298 (7th Cir. 2000).
209 Yelnosky, supra note 8, at 413.
210 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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First of all, the time, energy, and costs associated with litigation
and administrative proceedings suggest that employment testers will
not help fill the Title VII enforcement void.211 The very motive of
employment testers, however, also suggests that they lack the incen-
tive to bring suit under Title VII. The task of these testers is to un-
cover evidence of discrimination in the workplace rather than bring
suit every time they uncover such evidence.2 12 Not only might Title
VII fail to protect testers, but it is not clear that testers are harmed
since they accomplish the very goal of uncovering discrimination
when they are refused employment or a referral.2 13  Consequently,
this absence of harm not only implicates the Article I injury re-
quirement, but also raises the inference that they lack the necessary
commitment to seek redress in the courts. 2 14  The few cases where
employment testers have appeared individually as plaintiffs demon-
strate that testers are not filling Title VII's enforcement void.
2 15
In addition, just because testers are not granted standing does not
mean that the evidence they uncover cannot be used against the de-
fendant. 2 16  Supreme Court jurisprudence clearly provides that the
organization utilizing the testers may have standing under Title
217VII. Therefore, organizations utilizing testers can still sue to en-
force the statute on behalf of those bona fide applicants who, for
whatever reason, do not bring actions on their own behalf. As a re-
211 See, e.g., Turner, supra note 207, at 384 ("The processing of a Title VII charge requires
initial compliance with an often lengthy administrative process. The EEOC faces a current
backlog of over 90,000 pending charges and has had its budget reduced by $13,000,000.")
(footnote omitted); Yelnosky, supra note 8, at 411 (explaining that "high transaction costs" and
"other disincentives probably have led to underenforcement of Title VII in [hiring discrimina-
tion] cases") (footnote omitted). Of course, organizations utilizing testers may provide mone-
tary and other support to the testers, thereby eliminating or at least reducing the impact of these
disincentives.
212 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
213 See, e.g., Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Servs., Inc., No. 97-C-8311, 1998 WL 677165, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 1998) ("A favorable outcome would result in nothing more for [the tester
plaintiffs] personally than perhaps some satisfaction that their summer work was championing
the rights of humanity at large against racial discrimination."). See also note 168 and accompa-
nying text.
214 See Yelnosky, supra note 8, at 412.
215 Fair Employment Council and Kyles are the only reported cases where employment
testers individually have brought suit under Title VII since the EEOC endorsed the use of testers
in 1990.
216 This evidence is extremely valuable in the enforcement of Title VII hiring discrimina-
tion claims as little is known about the nature and extent of this discrimination. See TURNER ET
AL, supra note 16, at 5 (explaining that "little is known about how often [minority job appli-
cants] are treated less favorably than equally qualified majority job applicants"). See also
Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The evidence provided by testers..
. is a major resource in society's continuing struggle to eliminate the subtle but deadly poison of
racial discrimination.").
217 See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976) (explaining that an
association can have standing on the basis of direct injury against itself as an association).
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suit, the broad aims of the Act can still be met and the enforcement
void filled by these organizations. As a part of their prima facie
cases, these organizations may rely on the evidence garnered by the
testers to support their claims. Since organizations have the funds
and time to pursue such lawsuits, unlike most individual plaintiffs,
they are in a better position than testers to fill the aforementioned en-
forcement void. Consequently, so long as testers are still able to seek
out discriminatory practices, then they will still be able to advance the
broad aims of Title VII absent a grant of standing.
218
B. The Motive of Testers and the Difficult Road to Recovery
Another factor militating against tester standing is that courts
have continually held that plaintiffs must be bona fide job applicants
in order to prove the prima facie case for hiring discrimination under
Title VII.
The first employment testers seeking recovery under Title VII did
not have to confront the standing issue. This is because courts adju-
dicating early employment tester cases looked past the standing re-
quirement altogether, focusing instead on the merits of the plaintiffs
claim. A common theme emerged from these early tester cases: re-
covery hinges on the primary motive of the plaintiff. Consequently,
employment testers could not recover under Title VII in these cases
because they were not genuinely interested in the employment for
which they applied.
Ironically, the case first enunciating this theme actually resulted
in equitable relief for the testers. In Lea v. Cone Mills Corp.,2 19 tester
plaintiffs were able to enjoin defendant's discriminatory hiring prac-
tices, 22  but were not awarded damages. The district court limited
recovery to equitable relief because the plaintiffs were not genuinely
interested in employment.2 21 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision not to award damages, acknowledging
218 Nevertheless, some commentators do not believe testers will be utilized on a wide scale
due to the difficulties and expense associated with testing programs. See, e.g., Michael Bolo-
gna, Discrimination: Seventh Circuit Affirms Testers' Access to Sue Under Title VII in Federal
Courts, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 131, at AA-1 (July 7, 2000) (reporting the following com-
ments of Christine Cooper, a law professor at Loyola University School of Law: "'I do not think
[the Kyles decision] opens the floodgates to testing. Testing is very expensive. Testing is very
complex. There are very rigid protocols that have to be followed in any good and fair testing
project."').
219 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969).
22 Under the current state of the law, testers cannot successfully enjoin discriminatory
practices. Consequently, the debate as to whether employment testers may recover if they are
found to have standing focuses on damages rather than on injunctive relief. See supra notes
118-19 and accompanying text.
221 See Lea, 301 F. Supp. at 102.
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that "specific employment was not sought '222 and that "the applica-
tion [might] solely [have been] a predicate for the suit." 2
23
Soon after Lea, the Supreme Court adopted a three-step test to de-
termine whether or not a plaintiff can recover for employment dis-
crimination under Title VII. 224 The first step in this process places
the burden on the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation, the elements of which are enunciated in the 1973 Supreme
Court decision McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.2 25  Therefore, all
plaintiffs seeking recovery under Title VII after 1973, including em-
ployment testers, needed to satisfy these elements before they could
hope to recover damages under Title VII. Pertinent to employment
testers is the second element of the prima facie case, which requires a
plaintiff to apply and be qualified for a job for which the employer or
employment agency was seeking applicants.226  Courts construing
this element have determined that employment testers cannot satisfy
this element. Specifically, a plaintiff cannot recover if his primary
motive is to gather evidence of employment discrimination. Rather, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that he is a bona fide applicant, genuinely
seeking employment, in order to satisfy the second element of his
prima facie case.
For example, a plaintiff who interviewed for a position for the
purpose of initiating a Title VII claim was not considered to be a bona
fide applicant under the statute.227  In another instance, a plaintiff
222 Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86,88 (4th Cir. 1971).
223 Id. Nevertheless, the court did award attorney's fees to the testers. Id.
2A See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the three-step
test: (1) the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case; (2) then the burden
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action taken;
and (3) the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's articulated reason
is merely pretext for discrimination. See id. at 802-04.
225 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (explaining that the plaintiff's prima facie case is established
if the plaintiff shows (1) that he belongs to a protected class, (2) that he applied and was quali-
fied for ajob for which the employer was seeking applicants, (3) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected, and (4) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications).
226 See supra note 225.
227 Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 657 F. Supp. 1022 (M.D. Ga. 1987). In
Parr, the plaintiff sued a prospective employer after the employer failed to hire him for the
position of field representative. The court found that the plaintiff was not genuinely interested
in the position. Rather, his true purpose was to create the basis for a Titie VII claim by inform-
ing the defendant in his interview that his wife was black. The court granted summary judgment
for the defendant after determining that the plaintiff could not satisfy the prima facie case out-
lined in McDonnell Douglas because the plaintiff had not applied for a position. See ki at 1032
("A plaintiff whose primary purpose in interviewing for a job is to create the basis for a Tite
VII EEOC charge and lawsuit, is not the bona fide applicant for a job that he must be to estab-
lish a prima facie case."). This case can be distinguished from other cases involving employ-
ment testers, however, since the plaintiff in Parr only interviewed for the position but never
submitted a resume or application.
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who had submitted an application for a job but had not updated the
application years later and was being paid substantially more at an-
other job also was not considered to be a bona fide applicant under
Title VII.228 In both of these cases, the courts determined that being a
bona fide applicant is necessary to recover under Title VII. Specifi-
cally, these courts found that the plaintiffs must be bona fide appli-
cants in order to satisfy the second element of the prima facie case for
discrimination as outlined in McDonnell Douglas, i.e., that they have
"applied for a job."'229  The plaintiffs in these cases, therefore, could
not prove that they applied for a job since they were not bona fide
applicants. Consequently, courts interpreting the McDonnell Douglas
prima facie elements have perpetuated the notion that the primary
motive of the plaintiff determines whether or not that plaintiff recov-
ers under Title VII.
The only court holding that an employment tester may actually
succeed in establishing his prima facie case is the Seventh Circuit in
Kyles v. J.K Guardian Security Services, Inc.230  Instead of defeating
the prima facie case, Kyles found that the bona fides of applicants
only "speak[] to the nature and extent of their injuries as well as the
appropriate relief., 231 After concluding that testers have standing, the
Kyles jury found in favor of the defendant, 232 and the court later de-
nied the employment testers' motion for a new trial.2 3 3  Therefore,
even if the motive of a tester does not preclude establishment of his
228 Allen v. Prince George's County, 538 F. Supp. 833 (D. Md. 1982). In Allen, the plain-
tiff initiated an action after the employer failed to contact the plaintiff about a position for which
the plaintiff was qualified. The court found that the plaintiff was not genuinely interested in the
position because she had not updated her application for over two years and was making more
money at her current job. The court granted summary judgment for the defendant after deter-
mining that the plaintiff could not satisfy the prima facie case outlined in McDonnell Douglas
since the plaintiff had not applied for a position. See id. at 841 ('The bona fides of plaintiff
Allen's desire to work for the [defendant] are suspect. As a part of her case, she must show a
genuine intention to accept employment by the [defendant] if offered to her at any time during
the period in question. Although plaintiff Allen did initially apply for the position, her actions
thereafter do not indicate that she was a person genuinely desiring to work as a secretary for the
[defendant].").
229 Although the Parr case involved a plaintiff that can be categorized as an employment
tester, the Allen case does not involve a tester plaintiff because the plaintiff did not submit her
application in order to gather evidence of discrimination. Nevertheless, the plaintiff in Allen is
analogous to the employment tester in Parr in that neither were bona fide applicants.
230 222 F.3d 289, 300 (7th Cir. 2000) (claiming that "we find no support in Title VII for a
requirement that a job applicant must have a bona fide interest in working for a particular em-
ployer if she is to make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination").
231 Id.
232 See Susan J. McGolrick, Race Discrimination: J.K Guardian Wins Jury Verdict in Bias
Suit by African American Testers, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 181, at A-14 (Sept. 18, 2000)
(referencing Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 97-C-8311 (N.D. I11. Sept. 15, 2000)
(finding by jury for defendant)).
233 See Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 84 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 928, 2000
WL 1810003 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2000).
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prima facie case as a matter of law, it appears that his motive never-
theless precludes recovery on the merits. The dim prospect of success
for a tester may actually demonstrate that it is better not to grant test-
ers standing. Maybe a truly discriminatory employer or employment
agency will be able to claim vindication from such court victories,
thereby jeopardizing the deterrent role of Title VII.
Of course, Kyles represents only one jury's view and it is not
certain that juries will rule against testers with consistency. If future
juries award employment testers damages, then the deterrent role of
Title VII might be served. Nevertheless, if the bona fides of an em-
ployment tester affect the amount of damages he can recover, the
most employers or employment agencies have to fear from employ-
ment tester suits are judgments for nominal damages. 234 It is not cer-
tain that even these successful employment tester suits would deter
future hiring discrimination due to their limited economic effect on
employers and employment agencies violating Title VII.
Finally, some commentators believe that employment testers are
overstepping ethical boundaries by entrapping otherwise law-abiding
employers and employment agencies into discriminating against235
them. In fact, the parent company of the defendant in Kyles even
filed suit against the employment testers for fraud.236  Even though
this suit was ultimately dismissed, 2 3 7 the threat of similar "retaliation
suits" provides an additional disincentive for employment testers to
fill the Title VII enforcement void.
23 8
234 See, e.g., Yelnosky, supra note 8, at 409 (concluding that "prevailing testers can obtain
only 'de mininis' or 'technical' relief from an offending employer and therefore cannot recover
attorneys' fees").
25 See John T. Sanders, How Ethical is Investigative Testing?, LAW & POL'Y REP., Feb.
1994, at 17 (contending that the practice of sending employment testers to businesses is easier to
defend from an ethical standpoint if an agency's investigation is based on an actual complaint,
rather than on the general antidiscrimination goals of the organizations utilizing the testers).
26 See Michael Bologna, Hiring: EEOC Will File Amicus Brief in Chicago Employment
Testing Case, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at A-5 (Feb. 18, 1999).
237 See Michael Bologna, Race Discrimination: Judge Dismisses Employer's Fraud Suit
Against Employment Discrimination Project, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 70, at A-5 (Apr. 11,
2000) (referring to K &J Management, Inc. v. Kyles, No. 98 L 0012726 (Cir. Ct. Cook County
April 6,2000) (dismissing fraud claim)).
28 See Roos, supra note 119, at 1693 (explaining that because the resolution of the fraud
suit in K & J Management "carries the force of law in only one state, the issue of potential fraud
claims brought against employment testers remains unsettled in the vast majority of American
jurisdictions"). Roos also comments that "the real possibility of being held personally liable for
statements and representations made throughout the job search process would discourage all but
the most determined individuals from undertaking the watchdog role of employment tester." Id.
at 1694.
20021
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
CONCLUSION
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 1981 have played instrumen-
tal roles in eliminating egregious forms of hiring discrimination. A
current enforcement void in hiring discrimination cases under Title
VII, however, suggests that employers and employment agencies are
discriminating with impunity. Organizations dedicated to rooting out
hiring discrimination have utilized employment testers to apply for
jobs or referrals for the sole purpose of uncovering discriminatory
hiring practices. Some of these testers have brought suits under §
1981 and Title VII. Courts have unequivocally determined that test-
ers bringing suits under § 1981 do not have standing to sue because
they do not intend to enter into contracts, but only seek to uncover
discrimination.
Standing for testers under Title VII, however, is an ambiguous
matter as courts directly addressing this issue have ruled both ways.
The strongest argument made by employment testers in favor of
standing depends on an analogy between Title VII and the Fair Hous-
ing Act, a statute interpreted by the Supreme Court in Havens Realty
to grant standing to housing testers. Nevertheless, inconsistencies
between Title VII and the Fair Housing Act suggest that the analogy
is flawed. Furthermore, standing for testers under the Fair Housing
Act may no longer be certain after Lujan, possibly precluding stand-
ing for employment testers even if they can draw an airtight analogy
to the Act.
In addition to these formal obstacles to standing, granting testers
standing will not eliminate the enforcement void of Title VII. While
information uncovered by employment testers may be utilized by or-
ganizations to fill the enforcement void, lack of time, money, and
utilitarian injury suggest that individual testers will not fill this void
on their own. Furthermore, difficulties in recovering damages under
Title VII give testers little incentive to bring suit. Finally, testers are
deterred from bringing suit due to their fear that defendants will bring
fraud claims against them-suggesting once again that it is better not
to extend standing to employment testers.
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